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“I don’t see any of your issues as insurmountable.”
- Seminole County Circuit Court Judge Debra Nelson, in denying a continuance motion filed by Zimmerman’s lawyer, Mark O’Mara.
I believe George Zimmerman’s defense is so busy prepping for the immunity hearing set for late April, that it’s one of the most important reasons why O’Mara filed the DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CONTINUE. Plus, time needed to sweeten the pot, of course. Granted, mounting a proper defense takes time, but O’Mara has been quick to point out that his client is so innocent, it’s blatantly obvious. SLAM DUNK! If anything, he should be in a hurry to end the nightmare he’s so sure his client is innocent of; and he’s said so on numerous occasions. I mean, why worry?
“I will call my wife as an expert witness that I want this case tried in June.”
- Mark O’Mara, at the hearing on February 5
The motion filed on January 30, sans photographic and assorted correspondence evidence, is fifteen pages long. Someone spent a lot of time putting it together, yet it was fatally flawed right from the start. If you read (5) on page one, O’Mara acknowledges:
“While it should be noted that the State Attorney’s Office has assisted the defense by organizing and presenting State witnesses for deposition without need for subpoena, there have been other problems and/or delays with discovery.”
Yet, on page three (7), the motion states:
“Again, while the State is within its right, under the letter of the rule, to demand […] formalities, that has cost hundreds of hours of additional time to be expended, which has delayed work and progress on other substantive matters.”
This is not quite the truth. The Defense spent many hours sweeping Judge Lester out the door. (See: WRIT OF PROHIBITION.) I am convinced the judge gave George Zimmerman a reprimand he most certainly deserved when his wife lied in open court and he kept his mouth shut. I also think Lester would have moved on from that point and been as fair as possible. It was simply a scolding — holding no further grudge. Regardless, the bottom line is that it was purely something the Defendant created and the State should not be blamed for this loss of precious time. Period. That’s what the continuance motion was all about; not enough time, yet it never once mentioned the time it took to file the writ, then the appeal and, finally, to win the appeal that ordered Lester’s removal from the case. Which leads to…
“The State can’t control the methodology the [defense] uses.”
- Bernie de la Rionda, at the hearing, on how the defense schedules its subpoenas
In the State’s rebuttal motion, STATE’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CONTINUE, Bernie de la Rionda let the Court know the Defense motion for a continuance was very one-sided and that he has complied with discovery rules. This is more about depositions:
“And while many depositions have been taken, in some cases it was only after the State repeatedly asked that depositions be set. There have been too many delays in getting Defense Counsel to schedule depositions, on at least four occasions depositions were scheduled (entire days were set aside), only to be informed by Defense Counsel the depositions were cancelled. The State has expressed its frustration with this process.”
Also written in the response was that, originally, both sides had agreed to set aside the entire week of January 28 for depositions, but as the week neared and nothing surfaced, the Defense informed the State that only two days would be allocated for depositions. Later, the State was informed that none would take place because the Defense was focusing on the preparation of the continuance motion during that week. This is all documented, too.
Of course, it almost goes without saying that Bernie de la Rionda formally objected to Mark O’Mara’s statement about the State’s formalities:
“The State has previously attempted to inform Defense Counsel of certain information during ‘informal discovery’ only to have the statements taken out of context and/or misstated in motions and arguments.”
De la Rionda wrote that the State will continue to comply with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, but will not provide them with a roadmap of what the evidence shows, nor will it connect the dots before depositions are taken. He also noted that the Defense complained about having to spend a great deal of time “reviewing and dealing with all the information ‘which has flowed through various social media sites, blogs, media outlets, and other vehicles’” without mentioning that Zimmerman and O’Mara created their own sites and continue to spend hours sorting through bits and pieces information. We need only look at the Sean Hannity interview for what makes this an example of hypocrisy in action.
One of the things that’s irked me for some time is the Defense’s propensity to blame the media for all of the information that’s out there for the public to pick through, yet it is responsible for a great deal of it. That’s the pot calling the kettle black, as far as I’m concerned. We live in a different world, too, and it’s now quite apparent that all of the negative publicity spewed during the nearly three years of the Casey Anthony case, from July 2008 to the onset of the trial in May 2011, did nothing to harm her in court. In this case, if anything, Zimmerman’s Defense has been doing a great job handling public relations. They should be counting their blessings, in other words.
1. Trial is presently set to begin on June 10, 2013.
a. Any Self-defense Immunity / Stand Your Ground motion shall be filed and heard on or before April 26, 2013, which is 45 days before trial.
b. Final witness lists, including any expected expert witnesses, shall be exchanged on or before March 27, 2013, which is 75 days before trial.
c. Any other pre-trial motions shall be filed and heard or [sic] before May 10, 2013, which is 31 days prior to trial.
d. Certain short-matter motions addressing purely legal matters may be heard on or before May 31, 2013, which is 10 days prior to trial.
e. No continuances [emphasis mine] of the trial will be granted on the basis that the parties have not complied with these deadlines.
There it is, folks, in simple black & white. No continuances; none simply granted, anyway, and Mark O’Mara should have expected the outcome going into Tuesday’s hearing. Shades of Judge Belvin Perry, Jr., who is also a stickler for dates and times. It should also be mentioned that, before her quick ruling, Nelson noted that she had two dates set aside for hearings to deal with discovery and other issues, but neither side took real advantage of them, not that the State seems to need them. That could have, quite possibly, hindered the Defense by not keeping the Court apprised of their situation throughout.
Oh well, it didn’t hurt to try on Tuesday but, times-a-wastin’ and there’s an immunity hearing to prep for…
Simon Barrett will return to the Internet airwaves today as he continues his ever popular blogtalkradio show. Today’s subject?
Casey Anthony - A Gift That Keeps Giving
1:00 PM EST
Join Simon, myself, and attorney Peter Haven, as we discuss Casey’s recent developments, including a Florida appeals court decision reducing her four misdemeanor convictions to two, plus her recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. Haven represented Ron Goldman’s family during the OJ Simpson civil trial. Goldman, if you recall, was murdered along with Nicole Brown Simpson. Haven is also on the board of directors of the Ron Goldman Foundation for Justice, which helps victims of crimes.
In POINT TWO of the appeal, Casey’s defense wrote that:
II. The Appellant’s constitutional rights were violated when she was convicted of four separate counts of providing false information to a law enforcement officer because each count stemmed from the same single offense where there was no break in the temporal aspect of the crime.
In that sense, if I fire a bullet through the brain of someone (who dies, obviously) and, as it passes through my intended victim, kills the person standing immediately behind him; does that constitute two homicides but one murder charge because it was one bullet? After all, it stemmed from the same single offense. That’s the logic of this Appellant’s argument. The defense also argued Fla. Const. Article 1 §9:
”[…] that individuals are given ‘protection from multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense arising out of a single episode.’”
I completely disagree. First, let’s look at the testimony by law enforcement at Casey’s murder trial acknowledged by her defense:
TRIAL TESTIMONY
Corporal Rendon Fletcher:
“Corporal Fletcher relayed that the Appellant, after questioning, stated that her daughter was missing, in the custody of a nanny, and that the Apppellant was conducting her own search.” LIE #1.
Lieutenant Reginald Hosey (then Sergeant) and Officer Adriana Acevedo:
”[…] Officer Acevedo escorted the Appellant to the last stated location of the ‘nanny.’” LIE #2.
Hosey: “[…] after being escorted to the Sawgrass Apartments, […] the Appellant was led back into her residence…” LIE #3. There was never a Zenaida Fernandez-Gonzalez living at Sawgrass, in Apt. #210 or anywhere else. She led Hosey on a wild goose chase.
Detective Yuri Melich:
“The recorded statement by the Appellant stated that she worked at Universal Studios, Zenaida Fernandez-Gonzales was Caylee Anthony’s babysitter, and that the Appellant informed Jeffery Hopkins and Juliette Lewis of the disappearance of her child.” LIE #4.
You cannot simply lie to every law enforcement officer that comes down the pike and consider it one big lie. It may have been one in Casey’s mind, but each lie to each officer is a separate offense.
On March 12, 2009, I addressed the fraud charges filed against Casey by her onetime friend, Amy Huizenga, on a post titled Double Jeopardy. Casey stole and cashed her checks while she was out of town. Thirteen third-degree felony charges were filed in all. She was convicted of six and Judge Stan Strickland withheld adjudication on seven.
This applies today because the defense tried to do the same thing then; to count the separate charges as one. They failed. On The Wisdom of Solomon, dated January 10, 2010 - three years ago! - I wrote:
Judge Strickland gave the defense an opportunity to challenge the charges. We can discuss the lack of brevity or the levity of the arguments, but let’s cut to the chase - it came down to the judge. First, it should be noted that Casey had no prior convictions and she did make full restitution and Baez did bring up “equal justice” for his client. He asked for one year of probation and credit for time served, rather than the five years of incarceration the State sought. In the end, His Honor sentenced the 23-year-old Casey to (jail) time served - 412 days - plus $5,517.75 in investigative costs and $348 for court. The amount may be discussed and negotiated at a later motion hearing because the defense found the investigative charge too high and not justifiable. He also adjudicated Casey guilty on six of the fraud counts and withheld adjudication on seven, plus he tacked on a year of supervised probation, which could be problematic and complex later on, given that she still faces a huge mountain of charges ahead. He said that he had given this a lot of thought prior to sentencing.
“There was not an even number of offenses, so I withheld in seven, I adjudicated in six. If that seems Solomon-like, it is.
On each and every count, Casey must submit a DNA sample because she is now a convicted felon. There it is, the words everyone has been waiting for…convicted felon. Time to move on to the next chapter, but first, Casey apologized to Amy Huizenga.
“I’m sorry for what I did. I’d like to sincerely apologize to Amy. I wish I would have been a better friend.”
§
That same standard for double jeopardy applies today, as surely as the day I wrote it in the 2009 article based on those fraud charges:
In essence, Casey’s defense team points out that under law, she should be charged for one crime by one count. The defense also claims that charging her with multiple counts for the same act prejudices her, therefore the counts should be dismissed.
According to the motion, “Miss Anthony is guaranteed double jeopardy protection by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution for duplicative charges.” Let’s take a look at what the law says:
I will leave the indentation out for now, but the following paragraphs are from my 2009 article:
Amendment 5 – Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment 8
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Florida Constitution – Article 1, Sections 9 and 17
SECTION 9. Due process.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.
SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.
Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden. The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by the legislature. The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any method of execution shall be allowed, unless prohibited by the United States Constitution. Methods of execution may be designated by the legislature, and a change in any method of execution may be applied retroactively. A sentence of death shall not be reduced on the basis that a method of execution is invalid. In any case in which an execution method is declared invalid, the death sentence shall remain in force until the sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method. This section shall apply retroactively.
The double jeopardy rule of the Fifth Amendment is intended to limit abuse by the government in repeated prosecution for the same offense as a means of harassment or oppression. It is also in agreement with the common law concept ofres judicata which prevents courts from relitigating issues which have already been the subject of a final judgment. There are three essential protections included in the double jeopardy principle, which are:
being retried for the same crime after an acquittal
retrial after a conviction
being punished multiple times for the same offense
Does the defense motion to dismiss those extra charges, something it sees as ancillary in nature, hold any merit? In Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, a split court found that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony was unconstitutional. In Solem, a bare majority of the court held a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
In Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, a life sentence without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine was upheld. The case produced five separate opinions. While seven justices supported a proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment, only four favored application of all three factors cited in Solem. As one court has concluded, disproportionality survives; Solem does not. (McGruder v. Puckett (5th Cir.’92) 954 F.2d 313, 316.) In Harmelin, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, determined Solem was wrongly decided and the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality guarantee. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, found the Eighth Amendment encompassed a narrow proportionality principle. In other words, the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime. Moreover, in Solem v. Helm, the court focused on the nonviolent nature of both the defendant’s current offense of uttering a ‘no account’ check (one of the most passive felonies a person could commit) and his prior offenses. The majority acknowledged a life sentence for fourth-time heroin dealers and other violent criminals would pass constitutional muster.
While we ponder the legality of the double jeopardy clause in the appeal, allow me to look at the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing which killed 168 people and was the deadliest act of terrorism within the United States prior to the 9/11 attacks. I don’t need to go into any detail of what transpired. This is purely about the charges, the trial, and the conviction.
On August 10, 1995, Timothy McVeigh was indicted on 11 federal counts, including conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, use of a weapon of mass destruction, destruction by explosives and 8 counts of first-degree murder. On June 2, 1997, McVeigh was found guilty on all 11 counts of the federal indictment. He was executed by lethal injection at 7:14 a.m. on June 11, 2001, at the U.S. Federal Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
Despite killing 168 people, McVeigh was only charged with 8 murders. Casey was convicted of four misdemeanor counts of lying to law enforcement personnel. The convictions should stand. Double jeopardy, in this case, would mean reducing her convictions from four to one. No dice, I say! Why? If Timothy McVeigh’s attorneys used the same logic and prevailed in a similar motion to dismiss the counts by reducing the eight murder charges to one, that means out of 168 deaths he was responsible for, he would have been tried for one single murder and the entire weight of those deaths would have been reduced from 8 to 1. Would he have been sentenced to death for one murder? If so, would it have been appealed? Yes, and it would have carried much less weight. With Casey, it’s the same thing in my book, although the charges are not similar. I am merely making an analogy.
Ultimately, double jeopardy should not be an appeal issue as far as I’m concerned. Casey was convicted, sentenced, and she did her time on all four counts. That cannot be taken away from her. In the end, it will hinge on whether she was in police custody when she was questioned. Was she free to go and was she Mirandized? Should she have been? By her own admission, she spoke freely. Should she have been Mirandized just because she decided to sing like a bird? Not until she was placed in custody, meaning under arrest or when her freedom was greatly deprived; enough to be equal to an arrest. Custody could be interpreted as being handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car. It could also include her interrogation — an attempt to elicit incriminating statements — but to what extent? Who said she was a suspect at the time?
I believe the appellate judges will rule against her. Those misdemeanor convictions will stand by a vote of 2-1. No matter what the outcome is, she’s still — and shall always remain — a convicted felon. Thank you, Amy Huizenga.
In its SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS from the INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, concerning Casey Anthony’s four misdemeanor convictions of lying to law enforcement officers, her defense wrote:
There’s three points on appeal. First, the lower court [9th Circuit] erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to suppress her statements to Detective Melich. The record establishes that the Appellant was placed under arrest, never Mirandized, and subsequently interrogated. Either the statements occurred at the Appellant’s residence or Universal Studios. At both locations, the Appellant was in custody. At her residence, the Appellant was unhandcuffed and questioned to purposely avoid informing her of her Miranda Rights. At Universal Studios, the Appellant was in custody, placed in a small room for questioning by three members of law enforcement, confronted with evidence against her for an extended period of time, and never informed of her rights under Miranda. In either scenario, the Appellant’s statements were involuntary[emphasis mine] and, therefore, the lower court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to suppress.
This article will focus on one aspect of the three points on appeal; whether Casey was read her Miranda warning and whether it was necessary while being questioned by law enforcement prior to her arrest. This will be a lengthy article, and most of the legal information comes from a post I wrote and published on March 9, 2011, A Sneaking Suspicion. Ultimately, I feel the appellate court will rule 2-1 against Casey. I base my decision on several things; all legal in nature. Please pay particular attention to the final part of this post, where the charges are listed. Remember, Casey was not charged with murder until October. Also, there’s an interesting video to watch. It’s short and, in it, she tells her brother that she WAS Mirandized, although the State did not argue that in court on Tuesday.
§
Keep in mind that this was written almost two years ago:
While sitting in the courtroom, I must say Cheney Mason impressed me. His voice was stronger than it usually is. During one of the detective’s testimony last week, he asked if he was familiar with the term unarrested. The detective responded positively. Yesterday, Mason exclaimed that there is no such thing as being unarrested. He went on to scrutinize the tactics of the deputies and detectives from the first hours they spent with Casey to the final moments they pressed the Anthony family into service to visit her in jail. Agents of the State? Please.
When Casey was driven to Universal, he asserted that the detectives were already aware that she wasn’t employed there. They had set the meeting up with the chief of security, where a small room was awaiting her for questioning. The door was closed, he said, and the intimidating tactics began. Voices were raised. Was she free to go, he wondered. No, of course not. She was at their mercy. No car and no one telling her she had a right to leave. The only way it could have been a voluntary interrogation would have been if she drove herself to meet them there.
He said it would have been impossible for trained law enforcement personnel to not treat her as some sort of suspect once they took a whiff of her car that first night. Where the defense had been weak in citing case law, Mason let loose here with the case of Ross v. State of Florida and the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling upon appeal:
After carefully reviewing the issues raised on appeal, we reverse the convictions and sentences of death because of the police conduct in interrogating Ross on January 9, 2004. Specifically, the police, over a period of several hours of custodial interrogation, deliberately delayed administration of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), obtained inculpatory admissions, and when the warnings were finally administered midstream, minimized and downplayed the significance of the warnings and continued the prior interrogation—all of which undermined the effectiveness of Miranda.
In Ross’s case, the court wrote that investigators mishandled his interrogation days after his parents were beaten to death with a baseball bat more than seven years ago. On 7 January 2004, Ross, then 21, called 911 to report that someone had murdered his parents. No weapon was ever found. The Supreme Court ruling described a pressure-packed investigation two days later in which a detective questioned Ross for hours without reading him his Miranda rights. The high court ruling states the detective deliberately delayed reading Ross his rights in an effort to obtain a confession, while assuring him that he was not under arrest, amounting to an involuntary confession. Specifically, law enforcement, over a period of several hours of custodial interrogation, deliberately delayed administration of the Miranda warning. According to the ruling, when Miranda warnings were administered “midstream,” detectives…
… minimized and downplayed the significance of the warnings and continued the prior interrogation — all of which undermined the effectiveness of Miranda.
There is another case in Florida that is a real puzzler. In Ramirez v. State, 1999 WL 506949, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed Nathan Ramirez’s conviction and death sentence for his role in the execution-style murder of Mildred Boroski, a 71-year-old widow. He and another man broke into her home, killed her dog, tied her to a bed and raped her. Then, they forced her into a car, dead dog and all, and drove her to a remote field where Ramirez shot her twice in the head.
Investigators with the police department discovered some of the woman’s possessions in Ramirez’s custody and asked him to go to the station for a taped interview. He agreed. The investigators began the interview without a Miranda warning because they thought he was only a witness rather than a murder suspect. Within a few minutes, he began to sing like a canary and one of the investigators stopped the interview to suggest he be Mirandized. The colleague immediately read Ramirez his rights which the (now) suspect acknowledged and waived. He proceeded to detail what transpired that day.
Sadly, the Florida Supreme Court reversed Ramirez’s conviction and sentence despite how careful and diligent the investigators were. Why? Four of the justices claimed that his Miranda warning was given in a manner that unconstitutionally minimized and downplayed the importance of his rights. They exploited his pre-Miranda admission about being in the house.
That’s bad enough, but back to the matter at hand. The most startling revelation made by Mason was his assertion that the first time Casey was Mirandized was not until 14 October 2008, when she was indicted on first-degree murder and other charges. I beg to differ with him. According to Casey’s ICJIS (fraud) Arrest Affidavit, she was read her Miranda warning by OCSO Detective Johan Anderson on 29 August 2008 at 2135 hours, or 9:35 pm:
I responded to 4937 Hopespring Drive and made contact with defendant Anthony. She was placed under arrest and transported to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. I read defendant Anthony her Miranda Rights and she advised that she did not want to speak to me without her lawyer. I terminated my interview and she was transported to BRC without incident.
Whether she was read her rights prior to this date is not readily available, but the above log refers to the fraud charges only. In any event, technically, she was read her Miranda Rights prior to 14 October. Was she advised of her rights before this exchange occurred on 16 July 2008?¹
“What happened to Caylee,” an investigator asks on the tape.
“I don’t know,” Casey Anthony said.
“Sure you do,” and investigator said.
“I don’t know,” Anthony said.
“Listen, something happened to Caylee,” an investigator said. “We’re not going to discuss where the last time you saw her (was). I’m guessing something bad happened to her some time ago and you haven’t seen her, so that part is true — is you haven’t seen her because she’s somewhere else right now.”
“She’s with someone else right now,” Anthony said.
“She’s either in a Dumpster right now, she’s buried somewhere, she’s out there somewhere and her rotten body is starting to decompose because what you’re telling us…,” an investigator said. “Here’s the problem. The longer this goes, the worse it’s going to be for everyone. Right now, everything you’ve told us — we’ve locked you into a lie. Every single thing that you’ve told us has been a lie.”
If she wasn’t read her rights before being interrogated, this could be a real problem because, clearly, she was the only suspect that law enforcement had as evidenced by their line of questioning. They were already on to her tricks.
On the other hand…
When Linda Drane Burdick approached the podium, she calmly stated that at no time was Casey in custody - there was no custodial interrogation. When at Universal Studios, Cpl. Yuri Melich wrote in his arrest affidavit, interestingly dated July 15:
At this time, we found a small conference room in which to talk to the defendant. This conversation was also recorded. Prior to beginning this interview, we stressed that the door was unlocked and were in the room for privacy only. She understood and agreed to speak with us on tape.
At no point in the arrest affidavit was it written that Casey was read her Miranda Rights. If there was ever a time for a sinking feeling, it may have come in the courtroom on Monday if she was not read her rights. There’s something else. Cpl. Yuri Melich made this notation in his affidavit:
I first met with the defendant inside her residence and spoke with her alone and away from other family members. Before asking for a recorded statement, I reviewed her original four page written sworn statement and asked if this was her version of what happened. She said it was. I told her that the incident was very suspicious and her version suspect.
Later that day, several of Casey’s friends and boyfriends called OCSO to report what they knew. It was a shock to everyone that darling Caylee was missing. Melich continues:
Once at our central operations center, and after I started receiving the above phone calls reference the defendant and her child, the defendant was given one more opportunity to change her story. She did not. She was then placed under arrest for child neglect, and providing false information to us regarding this investigation.
The official charges were:
Neglect of a child 827.03 (3)(C)
False Official Statements 837.06
Obstruct Criminal Investigation 837.055
However…
At no time did Casey express an interest in remaining silent. Initially, as Linda Drane Burdick was quick to assert, Casey was not a suspect in the disappearance of her child when she was briefly cuffed and held in the back seat “cage” of Dep. Acevedo’s patrol car. She was never suppressed inside her house, nor was she ever held without her permission. Of course, common sense tells you when an officer of the law carries on a conversation and/or asks you to do something, you’d better comply, so there are gray areas defense teams are trained to exploit. Rightfully, Burdick contended that law enforcement merely treated Casey as a possible witness to some sort of kidnapping and there was no reason to Mirandize her.
I think before we continue, it’s important to clarify the written statement made by Casey. It came before she was handcuffed and placed in the police car.
Here comes the judge…
While Mason was arguing his case, Judge Perry broke in and asked him if he was familiar with Parks v. State (1994). Mason said no, and the judge advised him to read it. Now, if you want my opinion, when a judge suggests something to read, you’re darned-tootin’ I’m going to read it! The mere fact that a judge mentions case law is ominously significant, so here is where I think the judge will go with his decision regarding Miranda…
In the case of Darryl Parks v. State, in the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, the appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and three counts of armed robbery. He asserted four issues on appeal:
whether appellant’s motion to suppress his confession should have been granted;
whether the trial court erroneously allowed an accomplice’s prior consistent statement into evidence;
whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror; and
whether prosecutorial statements in closing arguments amounted to a comment on appellant’s exercise of his right to remain silent.
The appeals court affirmed as to all issues. However, their affirmance of issues one and two did warrant discussion. The following is quoted directly from the ruling. I will highlight key points:
On January 16, 1991, an individual wearing a mask entered a business in Broward County, began waiving a gun, and demanded money. The gunman was joined shortly thereafter by a second individual. During the course of the robbery, the owner of the business was fatally shot.
Five days after the shooting, appellant was arrested on an unrelated robbery charge. He was brought to the Broward County Sheriff’s Department homicide office for questioning concerning the murder. He was handcuffed and shackled. However, doubts arose concerning whether there was sufficient probable cause for appellant’s arrest. It was decided that appellant would be released. Appellant was advised he was free to go, the handcuffs and shackles were removed, and he was offered a ride home. Thereafter, but prior to leaving, appellant was asked whether he would remain and talk about the shooting. Appellant said he would talk to the officers about it. After appellant was informed of his Miranda rights, he was questioned by detectives. During this questioning, appellant made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder and robberies. Appellant said he was present and he only intended to rob the place. However, he admitted using a substandard quality gun and “it just went off.”
The evidence shows appellant freely and voluntarily gave his statement to police. Even if the police lacked probable cause for the arrest on the unrelated charge, the fact appellant was released from custody and voluntarily remained to answer questions breaks the causal link between the arrest and his making of the incriminating statements to police. Appellant’s agreement to discuss the crime when he was free to decline and go home was an act of free will sufficient to purge any possible taint from the arrest. We find the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress appellant’s incriminating statements.
Parks asserted that the trial court improperly allowed a prior statement by his accomplice into evidence to help build the case against him. The day after he was arrested for the murder, Terrance Batten was brought to the police station for questioning. After being informed of his Miranda Rights. He then gave a tape recorded statement to police which implicated himself and Parks in the murder. About 22 months later, Batten received a plea deal from the state.
At trial, Batten testified about the shooting and robberies. He said appellant shot the victim. On direct examination, Batten acknowledged he gave a statement to police shortly after the shooting. During cross-examination by defense counsel, Batten was extensively questioned about his plea deal with the state. The details of the deal were spelled out for the jury. Batten was also questioned about the circumstances surrounding his prior statement made to police. Batten acknowledged the detectives told him that they did not want him, but wanted appellant. Batten also acknowledged he was told if he did not cooperate, he would be charged with murder and sentenced to the electric chair. He admitted he was thinking if he gave a statement to the detectives he could go home, but if he did not give them a statement he was going to be held on the murder charge.
Defense counsel also questioned Batten about specific contents of his prior statement. Batten was asked about his comments concerning who he was with prior to the robbery. Defense counsel noted that Batten said in his statement to police he was cooperating because the victim was shot. Also, Batten acknowledged there is no mention of a mask in his prior statement.
During the testimony of one of the detectives who questioned Batten, the tape-recorded statement was admitted into evidence over defense objection. Defense counsel had argued the prior consistent statement itself was made after Batten had an improper motive. Therefore, it was inadmissible.
Here’s the clincher, though:
We agree with appellant that the prior consistent statement should not have been admitted into evidence. Generally, prior consistent statements are not admissible to corroborate a witness’ testimony. Jackson v. State, 498 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1986). An exception to the rule provides that such statements are admissible to rebut charges of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication against the witness. Id. at 910; see also § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). However, the prior consistent statement must be made “prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, corruption, or other motive to falsify.” Dawson v. State, 585 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
We hold, however, that the erroneous admission of Batten’s tape recorded statement was harmless. The jury was aware of the existence of the prior statement. A reasonable jury could presume the prior statement was consistent with Batten’s in-court testimony. Further, defense counsel delved into some of the specifics of the statement, referring to actual comments made by Batten to police. Thus, portions of the statement were highlighted for the jury, by defense counsel, prior to the admission of the statement in its entirety.
These factors, in combination with appellant’s incriminating statements and testimony linking appellant to an item stolen in the robbery, convince us of the harmless nature of the trial court’s error. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). We therefore affirm appellant’s convictions on all counts.
AFFIRMED.
What does this tell me? Well, when Mason mentioned October 14 - and he did so twice - and the State did not counter, it sent a message. Two times and the prosecution came back with no response. I think the judge is going to allow Casey’s early statements [made in July of 2008] to stand until a clearly defined moment surfaces that distinguishes her standing with the police.
§
Back to the present…
If you’ve ever watched COPS, you’ve seen officers detain and handcuff people not under arrest, and they make their point clear about doing so for everyone’s safety; the detainee’s and the officer’s.
Ultimately, Judge Perry did side with the State on both motions filed by the defense. In his decision, Perry wrote that the test of law primarily focused upon the perceptions of the suspect, not the intent of the police. In this regard, Casey was quite aware of what was going on around her, yet she continued to blab, acknowledging that she didn’t need to do that. George Zimmerman spoke freely, too, and this may work against him if he loses his battle in court and goes for an appeal.
Next, I will explain double jeopardy and I promise it won’t be as long.
In his ORDER SETTING BAIL on July 5, 2012, Judge Kenneth Lester made several stipulations clear about what attorney Mark O’Mara’s client, George Zimmerman, could and could not do. For instance, he would be able to travel anywhere he wants as long as it’s within the boundaries of Seminole County. If he finds it necessary to leave the county, all he has to do is pass it by the court for authorization. It’s a rather plain and simple directive and something a five-year-old should be able to comprehend.
However…
In his MOTION TO MODIFY CONDITIONS OF RELEASE dated August 22, 2012, Mr. Zimmerman, through his attorneys, cited two issues pertaining to matters addressed in the judge’s above order. Call them problematic. The Court, for instance, must realize by now, due to the great amount of national and international publicity, not to mention notoriety and animosity, that Zimmerman “and his entire extended family have had to live in hiding, fearing for their own safety.” Therefore, he should be able to move out of the county, too.
I disagree with Mr. O’Mara’s choice of words. He exaggerates. How? In many ways, but for now, here’s a ‘for instance.’ It’s one thing to complain about the woes that have befallen his client, but his client and only his client was responsible for the big mess he’s in — not his family. Daddy did not hold his hand the night he pulled the trigger. Therefore, why bother bringing up any issue over his family’s fears for their own safety? It’s not that I don’t care, it’s just that there is nothing stopping them from moving out of the area any time they please. There are no restrictions on them whatsoever, and to suggest in that motion, albeit indirectly, that the Court was somehow responsible for this problem is, well, not showing a clear sense of responsibility. There is no way the Court can magically order the public to leave the Zimmerman family alone.
This is George’s unfavorably conducive style; his M.O. These are his edicts, sua sponte, not necessarily those of his attorneys. While his motions are filled with innuendos that tend to absorb what little substance they hold, it’s when he opens his mouth that we see him for what he is.
Full of Zimmermanure.
He not only speaks with a forked tongue, he also twists his tongue when he speaks. A good example of this came during his Hannity interview on FOX News. When asked if he would have done anything any differently, given ample opportunity to think about it now, he said he really hadn’t had the time to think about it, but after thinking about it, he wouldn’t have changed a thing. He regretted nothing and it was God’s plan. He had nothing to feel sorry about. Did that make sense? Wait. It gets worse.
Later in the broadcast, he turned and faced the camera, and in his best “My fellow Americans…” presidential-style address, he apologized to the nation, his wife, and everyone involved in the case, including Trayvon Martin’s parents. In my opinion, it was, at best, sickeningly insincere. Incidentally, a truly biased judge would have called him on the carpet for addressing Trayvon’s parents because, in his order, Judge Lester wrote:
“The Defendant shall not have any contact with the victim’s family, directly or indirectly, except as necessary to conduct pretrial discovery through his attorneys[.]”
Redundancy
My complaint, while being about the Petitioner, also includes his attorney and how he’s handling the case; his motions, in particular. In this very same Motion To Modify Conditions Of Release, O’Mara wrote:
“One of the conditions of release is that Mr. Zimmerman is not to leave Seminole County without prior authorization by this court.”
Right, Mr. Knechel, you already said that. Well, yes I did, but so did the judge and Defense, and just to clarify, this is a two-part motion. The second part addressed traveling outside the county, not moving out. The judge’s order covered it and the defendant acknowledged it, so what was the point of this final statement in Zimmerman’s latest motion?
“The restriction of Mr. Zimmerman not to leave Seminole County has had a deleterious effect on his ability to assist in the preparation of his own defense. Communications have been unnecessarily limited to telephone and occasional visits by counsel. Mr. Zimmerman must be able to travel to meet with his lawyers, and to attend to various other necessary matters to prepare this matter to move forward.”
Hmm… deleterious… injurious to health; pernicious, hurtful, destructive and noxious according to dictionary.com. My, what $5.00 words he uses that won’t impress any sitting judge let alone little old me. While I realize the motion also asked that Zimmerman be allowed to move outside of Seminole County, a request the Court denied, the rest of it is redundant. Here, verbatim, is what the judge wrote in his July 5 order:
“The Defendant shall not leave Seminole County without prior authorization by this Court[.]”
How much clearer can one get? All the defense had to do was ask. Why was it necessary to dedicate the brunt of this motion on something that was already covered a month-and-a-half earlier? And if O’Mara were really fearful of Zimmerman’s safety while residing somewhere in the entire county of Seminole, how much safer should he feel while his client is sitting in his office in downtown Orlando? Talk about deleterious! I’m serious.
Here’s the way I see George Zimmerman. When he doesn’t get what he wants, he whines and cries. He feels boxed in and claustrophobic. He gets restless and can’t sleep at night. His mattress turns lumpy. You see, George is starting to remind me of The Princess and the Pea with one major difference. He cannot get a comfortable night’s sleep until all his demands are met. The pea, in this case, is Kenneth R. Lester, Jr. who must be removed and replaced by a fairy tale friendly judge so Prince George, his friends, his family and his fellow American loyalists will be allowed to live happily ever after.
Fearing Fear Itself
In Nit-Picking Nit-Writ, I addressed the PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION filed by the Zimmerman defense. I pointed out how O’Mara had offered evidence about the shooting on the night of February 26 and why it was not only unnecessary, it was useless. A writ of prohibition, in this case, only pertains to why the trial judge should be recused. It’s not for anything else. What O’Mara did was inflate a very weak document with superfluous fluff, like adding TVP to a package of fatty, grisly hamburger meat, and I don’t feel the appeal court is going to buy any of it.
I do believe that Assistant Attorney General Pamela Koller offered up a much meatier argument against the Defense appeal. I will elaborate on that a bit and address the finer points of the State’s RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION. In particular, I want to look into the two types of fear that the district court will examine — objective and subjective.
In 2005, I wrote a post about how slants change your views of the news. Titled, An unbiased look at news slants, I last updated it in February of 2010. I think it should give you a foundation on objectivity and subjectivity.
Objective information strives to remain unbiased. Dictionaries and other materials of reference, such as encyclopedias, generally provide factual information. Traffic lights are red, green and yellow. Yellow means caution, green means to go and red means to stop.
Subjective information is formed by personal opinion. Editorial sections in newspapers are subjective. While editorials and letters to the editor can be based on fact, opinions are usually based on personal interpretations of facts. Humans are responsible for global warming. Global warming is caused by natural earth cycles, such as the Ice Age. In these cases, separate and valid viewpoints can be substantiated by citing legitimate sources.
We know that George and Shellie Zimmerman lied to the Court about access to money and a second passport they claimed they didn’t have. The judge acknowledged that in his order revoking bond and Team Zimmerman then proceeded to call it biased, including the judge’s reprimand. (It’s interesting to note that the defendant still managed to post bail despite the Court setting it much higher than what was originally granted.) The fact that bail was granted at all after the second request could be considered a testament to the judge’s fairness.
The Judge’s Order Setting Bail infuriated the Defendant and his counsel. How dare the Court look at his lies at all, let alone “judge” his actions and lack of respect for the court. To do so was nothing short of biased, they claimed, so they filed their writ of prohibition with the higher court. The bottom line now is how the Fifth District Court of Appeal will look at this motion — as an objective or subjective complaint — and rule accordingly, based on objectivity. Does Zimmerman have a leg to stand on? Is his distress based on a paranoid fear of persecution in general (subjective) or has this judge exhibited (objective) behavior in the past that truly legitimizes his concerns?
Let’s look at this objectively. In its response to the writ, the State wrote:
Petitioner complains about rulings in the past in his background section, but it is well established that “[t]he fact that the judge has made adverse rulings in the past against the defendant, or that the judge has previously heard the evidence, or ‘allegations that the trial judge had formed a fixed opinion of the defendant’s guilt, even where it is alleged that the judge discussed his opinion with others,’ are generally considered legally insufficient reasons to warrant the judge’s disqualification.” Rivera, 717 So. 2d at 481 (quoting Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d at 107; see also Areizaga v. Spicer, 841 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (It is well established that a trial court’s prior adverse rulings are not legally sufficient grounds upon which to base a motion to disqualify).
In other words, this is not merely a complaint about Lester’s language in the bail order, it’s also about his prior rulings in Zimmerman’s pretrial motions. This is something that should be taken up post-conviction, if necessary, not now, and it epitomizes my description of superfluous fluff; not worth the paper it’s printed on. What the defense wants to do is set a silly precedent; that every single defense motion denial is biased. This would then have to include every case that has ever come before a court. Overturn every verdict because motions were denied! All in the name of George! Clearly, this is subjective thinking. “I think,” O’Mara could opine, “every motion that was turned down was done so by judicial bias.”
Of course, it’s every defense attorney’s dream, but most are smart enough to know it’s nothing more than a whimsical flight of fancy. Cheney Mason tried the same thing during the Anthony case and got nowhere.
The State cited Rolle ex rel. Dabrio v. Birken, 984 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008):
Likewise, we recently pointed out that a “mere ‘subjective fear’ of bias will not be legally sufficient, rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable.” Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 41 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986)). We do not find Mansfield’s allegations of fear to be objectively reasonable. See also Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2000). Our cases support the trial court’s denial of the motionto disqualify, and we affirm the trial judge’s order.
Notwithstanding, Lester had every right to keep Zimmerman behind bars because the State went on to say that:
The judge again set a bond for Petitioner, and Petitioner is currently out on bond. Thus, the grounds listed by Petitioner in his motion are facially insufficient.
… and that the Petitioner is manipulating the system. From Cf. Brown, 561 So. 2d at 257 n. 7:
(“We hasten to add that our holding should not be construed to mean that a judge is subject to disqualification…simply because of making an earlier ruling in the course of a proceeding which had the effect of rejecting the testimony of the moving party. At the very least…there must be a clear implication that the judge will not believe the complaining party’s testimony in the future.”).
While the assistant attorney general cited many examples of why this particular writ of prohibition is without merit, it is, by its very nature, nearly as subjective as the writ itself. Both sides came to their respective conclusions based on their own interpretations of case law. As the appellate court looks at this issue with complete objectivity, it should see that Judge Lester has not been prejudiced against George Zimmerman — and most assuredly, not personally. In my opinion, based on what the Defense and State both submitted, the original motion to disqualify the trial judge in this case was legally insufficient. Judge Lester made the right choice, and so will the appellate judges, C. Alan Lawson, Jay P. Cohen and Kerry I. Evander.
Poor Prince George is not just afraid of a li’l old pea, he’s also afraid of his shadow. Oh, and don’t even get me started on (d)(1) and (d)(2). That’s a whole “nother” bedtime story.
Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 4:39PM 
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